DISLOYAL COMPUTER USE AND THE
COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT:
NARROWING THE SCOPE
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ABSTRACT
Congress drafted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
to protect government interest computers from malicious attacks by
hackers. As computer use has expanded in the years since its
enactment, the CFAA has similarly expanded to cover a number of
computer-related activities. This iBrief discusses the extension of
the CFAA into the employer/employee context, suggests that this
goes beyond the Act's express purpose, compares the different
approaches taken by the circuit courts in applying the CFAA to
disloyal computer use by employees, and argues that the more
recent approach taken by the Ninth Circuit provides a better model
for determining if and when the CFAA should apply to employees.

INTRODUCTION
Disgruntled employees beware. Those who exit their former
employment with photocopies of client lists or company financial
information have traditionally been susceptible to breach of contract,
fiduciary duty, and trade secrets suits in state court. More recently, those
who use a computer to email or otherwise obtain digital copies of such
information have found themselves susceptible to civil, and possibly
criminal, sanctions in federal court under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA). Initially crafted in the 1980s to impede remote computer
hacking, the CFAA opened the door to the federal courts for plaintiffs
seeking an easier path to combat employee misconduct based on an
employee's “unauthorized access” to a company computer.
¶1

¶2
The Seventh Circuit in International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v.
Citrin held that access is unauthorized for the purposes of the CFAA when
an employee decides to act contrary to his employer's interest. 2 Applying
principles of agency law, the court waded into muddy waters by allowing
the mental state of the employee to determine authorization. However, a
recent opinion from the Ninth Circuit in LVRC Holdings, L.L.C. v. Brekka 3
1

J.D. candidate at Duke University School of Law, Class of 2011; B.A.
Journalism 2005, Northern Kentucky University.
2
440 F. 3d 418, 420-21 (2006).
3
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20439 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2009).

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 012

rejected the Seventh Circuit’s approach and held that authorization is
granted by the employer and, therefore, that authorization ends when the
employer rescinds it. 4 This split in authority raises questions about how
broadly or narrowly the CFAA should be applied—or whether it should be
applied at all—in the context of an employee’s disloyal computer use.
¶3
This iBrief explores the evolution of litigation under the CFAA to
include actions by employers against employees who use a computer to
misappropriate, misuse or damage information belonging to the employer.
Part I discusses the creation and subsequent amendment of the CFAA from
a narrow tool for protecting federal interests against new crimes unique to
computer use to a broad method for bringing traditional state law claims
into federal court. Part II analyzes the split in authority between the
Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit regarding what constitutes authorized
access in the context of the CFAA. Part III concludes that the CFAA was
not designed to apply to employer/employee claims that are traditionally
handled under state tort and contract law. Consequently, courts faced with
similar suits should allow CFAA suits to proceed only when the computer
use was integral, rather than incidental, to the underlying claim. In the
alternative, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Brekka and
narrowly apply the CFAA to those situations in which authorized computer
access has not been granted or has been rescinded by the employer.

I. COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT: EXPANDING THE NET
¶4
The 1983 film War Games starred Matthew Broderick as a
computer whiz kid who unwittingly uses his home computer to hack into
NORAD's computer system. Broderick’s chicanery brought the United
States to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union.5 War Games
introduced much of the country to the “hacker,” and its influence was not
lost on members of Congress, who already were trying to decide what to do
about traditional property laws that were ill-equipped to deal with network
trespassers and intangible property that “may exist only in the form of
magnetic impulses.” 6 Recognizing that many states already had their own
computer crime laws, Congress stepped in gingerly with the Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (1984 Act). 7
¶5

4
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•

knowingly accessing a computer without authorization or
exceeding authorization to obtain classified information with
intent or belief that such information would be used to harm
the United States;

•

knowingly accessing a computer without authorization or
exceeding authorization to obtain financial or credit records
from a financial institution; and

•

knowingly accessing a computer used by or on behalf of the
United States if such access interferes with the government's
use of the computer. 8

¶6
Penalties included fines and imprisonment for up to ten years for
first offenses, twenty years for repeat offenses. 9 Operating with little data
illuminating the nature and extent of the problem posed by computer crime
at the time, “the 1984 Act essentially was a shot in the dark.” 10
¶7
Responding to criticisms and calls from the Department of Justice
to clarify and greatly expand the 1984 Act to cover a wider range of
activities, Congress adopted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986
(1986 Act). 11 Rather than create a broad preemptive statute, as some critics
suggested, legislators exercised caution and showed their continued
commitment to allow states to implement their own computer crime laws:

The Committee . . . prefers instead to limit Federal jurisdiction over
computer crime to those cases in which there is a compelling Federal
interest, i.e., where computers of the Federal Government or certain
financial institutions are involved, or where the crime itself is
interstate in nature. The Committee is convinced that this approach
strikes the appropriate balance between the Federal Government's
interest in computer crime and the interests and abilities of the States
to proscribe and punish such offenses. 12

The 1986 Act expanded the number of proscribed acts to include use of a
computer to steal property in an attempt to defraud; use of a computer to
intentionally alter or damage data in a federal interest computer; and the
trafficking of computer passwords. 13
8
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Subsequent amendments followed in 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1996,
2001, 2002, and 2008 as Congress attempted to keep pace with changes in
computer technology and use. 14 Most notable among these are the 1994 and
1996 amendments. In 1994, Congress added a private cause of action15 that
would ultimately open the door to the types of employer/employee disputes
discussed below. In 1996, the phrase “federal interest computer” was
replaced with “protected computer.” 16 “Protected computer” is defined as
one that is used by the United States Government or a financial institution;
or one that is used in interstate commerce or communication.17 These
amendments, in particular, broadened the scope of the CFAA far beyond its
original intent, and much of the careful consideration and debate undertaken
a decade earlier about the proper role of the federal government was
absent. 18 The inclusion of all computers used in interstate communication
had a profound effect, intentionally or otherwise, as any computer
connected to the Internet could be considered a “protected computer” under
the CFAA. 19
¶8

¶9
The seven types of activity covered by the current CFAA can be
summarized as follows:

1. obtaining national security information;
2. compromising the confidentiality of a computer;
3. trespassing in a Government computer;
4. accessing a computer to defraud and obtain value;
5. transmission or access that causes damage;
6. trafficking in passwords; and
7. extortion involving threats to damage computer 20

14
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Operating “without authorization” or “exceeding authorized access” is a
key element in the first five offenses. 21 “Exceeding authorized access” is
defined as “access[ing] a computer with authorization and us[ing] such
access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is
not entitle so to obtain or alter.” 22 “Without authorization” is not defined
in the text of the statute, and this, in conjunction with the “protected
computer” language, has led to a series of civil suits in which courts have
wrestled with how to define “without authorization.”23 In a larger
context, this is a question of how broadly the CFAA should be applied.
¶10
Congress decided early in the CFAA’s history that it wanted a
single statute to cover the field of computer crime “rather than identifying
and amending every potentially applicable statute affected by advances in
computer technology.” 24 The price for this legislative expediency is that
one relatively brief statute is applied to a range of disparate activities such
as fraud, trespass, spam, phishing, worms, viruses and denial of service
attacks. 25 This has inevitably forced square pegs into round holes. One
area in which the courts’ struggles have been particularly noticeable is in
civil suits brought by employers against former employees who are accused
of misappropriating or misusing information while they were still
employed. 26

II. EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT UNDER THE CFAA
¶11
An employee, having decided to leave her current employer for
greener pastures, emails confidential files from her work computer to her
personal email account. She then leaves her job to join a competitor and
discloses the confidential information to her new employer.27 Undoubtedly
her actions were wrong and could subject her to a number of claims under
state law such as tortious interference and misappropriation of trade

21
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secrets, 28 but do they run afoul of the CFAA? Assuming the plaintiff can
show damage or loss of the statutory minimum $5,000, 29 the answer turns
on how the court defines “without authorization.” There is a split of
authority between the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, the only
appellate courts to have ruled on this issue. The Seventh Circuit held that
the above facts presented a valid CFAA claim, while the Ninth Circuit held
the opposite. The core difference between these two rulings was the
circuits’ interpretation of the phrase “without authorization.”

A. International Airport Centers v. Citrin: Authorization and Agency
¶12
In 2006, the Seventh Circuit was the first appellate court to wade
into the “without authorization” debate that had been ongoing among the
district courts for more than five years.30 In International Airport Centers,
L.L.C. v. Citrin, the defendant, was employed by the plaintiff to look for
and help acquire real estate.31 Citrin decided to quit working for
International Airport Centers (IAC) and start his own business. 32 Prior to
leaving IAC, Citrin erased all the data on a laptop computer provided by
IAC, some of which would have shown he had engaged in improper
conduct and none of which IAC had any additional copies. 33 Citrin
installed and used a secure-erase program to do this, which meant that the
data were truly unrecoverable.34 IAC sued under the CFAA's civil
provision, § 1030(g), claiming Citrin had violated § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), which
provides that such violation occurs when one “knowingly causes the
transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result
of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a
protected computer.” 35
¶13
The court, citing congressional intent that the CFAA should reach
internal as well as external actors, readily settled on a broad definition of
what constitutes a transmission.36 While not quite holding that pressing the
delete key constitutes a transmission, the court nevertheless determined that
installing the secure-erase program—whether installed remotely or by an

28

See id. (denying defendants' motion to dismiss trade secrets and tortious
interference claims).
29
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31
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32
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actor with direct physical access—constituted a transmission in accordance
with the CFAA. 37
¶14
The court next turned to the authorization element of § 1030(a)(5).
Here, the court applied principles of agency law and determined that Citrin's
authorization to access the laptop computer ended at the moment he
violated his employment contract by deciding to act contrary to IAC's
interests, i.e., before he erased the data on the computer's hard drive.38 That
authorization, the court said, was granted through the agency relationship
Citrin had with his employer and implicitly ended when he violated his duty
of loyalty to that employer. 39
¶15
This application of agency law to the CFAA was not a novel
concept, as it mirrored an earlier district court decision in Shurgard Storage
Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.40 There, a rival storage
company hired some of plaintiff's employees, who, before leaving their old
positions, emailed confidential information about their former employer’s
business. 41 Shurgard sued, claiming three CFAA violations.42 The
defendants, seeking a dismissal for failure to state a claim, argued that
CFAA provisions requiring that they act without authorization did not apply
because they were, in the scope of their employment with plaintiff,
authorized to access the information that they passed to their future
employer. 43 Plaintiff raised the agency argument based on § 112 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency:

Unless otherwise agreed, the authority of an agent terminates if
without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interest or if
he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal. 44

The court accepted the plaintiff’s agency argument and denied the
defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion. 45

37
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WASHBURN L.J. 223, 240 (2006).
38
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¶16
Inherent in both Citrin and Shurgard is the policy judgment made
by each court that these kinds of employer–employee claims should, or at
least can, be handled under the CFAA. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit
did not spend much time discussing the law’s legislative history other than
to make conclusory remarks regarding Congress’s concern with protecting
against direct, internal attacks as well as external attacks. 46 The defendants
in Shurgard, however, directly raised the policy question, and the court
discussed at some length the language it finds in the legislative history
supporting a narrow, and conversely, a broad interpretation of the intent
behind the CFAA. 47 The court ultimately found language in the record that
convinced it that the CFAA, at least since the time of the 1996 amendment,
was meant to cover the present facts.48

[I]ndividuals who intentionally break into, or abuse their authority to
use, a computer and thereby obtain information of minimal value of
$5,000 or less, would be subject to a misdemeanor penalty. The crime
becomes a felony if the offense was committed for purposes of
commercial advantage or private financial gain, for the purposes of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation . . . of the laws of
the United States or of any state, or if the value of the information
obtained exceeds $5,000. 49

The Shurgard court ultimately found the statutory language to be
unambiguous and confirmed its conclusion through a review of the
legislative history. 50

B. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka: Active Authorization
¶17
The CFAA authorization issue resurfaced at the appellate level in
2009, this time in the Ninth Circuit in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka. 51
Brekka was hired by LVRC to oversee Internet marketing for its residential
treatment facility. At the time, Brekka owned and operated two consulting
companies that referred potential clients to rehabilitation facilities. Brekka
was given administrative access to information related to LVRC's business
including a financial statement and patient admission reports. Brekka
emailed some of these documents and others he created for his work at
LVRC to his personal computer. When ownership negotiations between
Brekka and LVRC broke down, Brekka left the company, which

46
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Id. at 1128-29 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7-8 (1996)).
50
Id. at 1129.
51
581 F. 3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
47

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 012

subsequently sued, claiming that Brekka violated the CFAA when he
emailed company records to further his own interests.52
¶18
LVRC argued the agency theory of authorization endorsed in Citrin
by saying Brekka’s authorization to access the confidential files ended when
he began acting contrary to LVRC's interests.53 The court held that the text
of the CFAA provided no definition of “authorization,” so the court turned
next to its common usage. “[I]t is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction . . . that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” 54 For this, the
court turned to a straightforward dictionary definition of “authorization” as
“permission or power granted by an authority.” 55 The court found no
language in the CFAA that either contradicted this straightforward
definition or supported LVRC’s agency-based definition. 56 The former
definition can be understood as active authorization, while the latter might
be considered passive authorization. Active authorization is granted by one
to another and ends when and where the authority chooses. In the present
case, then, Brekka’s authorization persisted until LVRC terminated his
employment or revoked his permission to access the company's files. 57
Passive authorization, in contrast, is received and disappears when the
authorized person has a change in purpose, e.g., when one chooses to act
contrary to the authority’s interest. The Brekka court expressly rejected
Citrin and this latter definition in the CFAA context because it would lead
to less clarity and notice to potential offenders, particularly when the
conduct is subject to criminal penalties.58 “The Supreme Court has long
warned against interpreting criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways
that impose unexpected burdens on defendants.” 59
¶19
Consequently, the court held that the CFAA is not applicable to
factual situations such as these, where authorization to access the
information in question was clearly granted and not clearly revoked. 60
Instead, it implied that the provisions of the statute containing the
authorization element should be applied to a narrower range of cases “when
the person has not received permission to use the computer for any purpose
(such as when a hacker accesses someone's computer without any

52

Id. at 1129-30.
See id. at 1132.
54
Id. (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
55
Id. at 1133 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 (2001)
(emphasis added).
56
Id. at 1133.
57
See id. at 1135.
58
Id. at 1134-35.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 1135.
53

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 012

permission), or when the employer has rescinded permission to access the
computer and the defendant uses the computer anyway.” 61

III. RESTORING SOME BALANCE
¶20
Whether the Supreme Court ultimately determines how to define
“authorization” under the CFAA or Congress undertakes this on its own, the
implications of the ultimate decision will be far reaching.
¶21
A broad definition as in Shurgard and Citrin opens the federal
courthouse to a number of scenarios not intended by the legislators who
crafted the CFAA. 62 Plaintiffs would like to have this choice of venue open
to them because it provides them with strategic advantages, such as a
shorter wait for a trial date and less limitations on discovery. 63
Additionally, supplemental jurisdiction would allow plaintiffs to have any
purely state law claims attached to the facts of their CFAA claim to be tried
in federal court.

While allowing access to federal court in these kinds of cases is not
problematic per se, two additional considerations weigh against adopting
the Citrin view. First, there is the issue of clarity and notice raised by the
court in Brekka. Under the broad, agency definition, employees could be
subject to penalties under the CFAA if their employers can claim that their
authorization was revoked because they did something believed to be
contrary to the employers’ interests. Second, scenarios exist in which the
Citrin definition lowers the evidentiary bar for plaintiffs. Trade secret
litigation is one example, where the traditional burden of showing that the
information provides a competitive advantage and was kept in secrecy is
nonexistent in the CFAA, and plaintiffs must show only that the
information was taken from a protected computer and that they suffered the
requisite damage or loss. 64 It is difficult to imagine that Congress intended
the CFAA to short-circuit state law in this way.
¶22

¶23
A narrow definition, on the other hand, has the dual benefit of
providing a clearer standard and being in accord with the initial spirit and
purpose of the CFAA. While it would preclude cases such as Shurgard,
Citrin, and Brekka from getting into federal court, each would be able to
proceed under various state law claims. For scenarios in which the use of a
computer is incidental, rather than integral, to the offense it would seem that
61

See id. at 1135.
See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(overturning a lower court CFAA conviction based on violations of a website
terms of service agreement).
63
Stephen R. Buckingham, Court Gives New Use to 1994 Law: Trade Secrets,
NAT’L L.J., Feb. 5, 2001.
64
Id.
62
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requiring such claims to go forward in state court is in accordance with
finding “the appropriate balance between the Federal Government’s interest
in computer crime and the interests and abilities of the States to proscribe
and punish such offenses.” 65

CONCLUSION
¶24
The CFAA has broken free of its moorings as a criminal statute
primarily aimed at penalizing the malicious computer hacking of
government interest computers. The definition of a computer protected
under the Act dramatically expanded to include any computer used in
interstate commerce or communication, i.e., any computer connected to the
Internet. Opportunistic plaintiffs have until recently found the federal
courts amenable to its use in civil suits against disloyal employees. The
Supreme Court ultimately may determine whether Brekka marks a return to
a more limited application of the CFAA in line with its original purpose. In
the interim, Brekka at a minimum provides a clearer, more workable
standard by which to determine the Act's applicability to the employer–
employee context.

65
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